NEW DELHI: The India–US trade deal has helped steady a relationship that had drifted off balance, but whether it can deliver long-term stability remains uncertain. Even in its conditional form, the agreement is significant, as it averts an immediate crisis and removes a major obstacle that was threatening to undermine cooperation with India’s most important strategic partner across multiple domains.
Yet, the strain in ties since Donald Trump’s return to the White House has not been limited to trade. Several other friction points continue to pose risks to the relationship.
Foremost among these is the renewed re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan, a consequence of Trump’s outreach to Rawalpindi. US ambassador to India Sergio Gor—who appears to have helped resolve the trade impasse within weeks of his arrival—may again find himself playing a crucial role. His dual position as ambassador and Trump’s special envoy for South Asia has drawn attention, and any move that brackets India with Pakistan or attempts third-party mediation will face firm resistance. Bilateralism remains the cornerstone of India’s Pakistan policy, and New Delhi has made it clear that there is no space for external arbitration.
A second area of concern is Washington’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific under Trump, who has signalled an interest in engaging Chinese President Xi Jinping for a “stable peace, fair trade and respectful relations.” Trade tensions between India and the US had earlier constrained momentum within the Quad, and a reset in bilateral ties could clear the way for renewed engagement, including a possible Quad summit and a Trump visit to India. While an informal meeting of Quad foreign ministers on the sidelines of this week’s critical minerals meeting in the US could help revive the grouping, no such proposal had emerged till Monday. Notably, the US National Defense Strategy for 2026 emphasises maintaining a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific but makes no explicit reference to the Quad or even to India.
India’s strategic autonomy is likely to remain a limiting factor that both sides will have to navigate. New Delhi will continue to balance its relationships with the US, Russia and China. While Trump has claimed that India has agreed to stop buying Russian oil, India is expected to maintain close ties with Moscow in defence cooperation and in multilateral forums such as the SCO and BRICS. From India’s perspective, allowing Russia to drift further towards China and Pakistan would be counterproductive. New Delhi is keen to signal that any energy realignment is driven by market conditions rather than a dilution of strategic autonomy, and an early Modi–Putin phone call to prevent misinterpretation is not being ruled out.
Another persistent irritant for India is the restructuring of the US H-1B visa programme. The removal of the lottery system, the introduction of a $100,000 fee, and ongoing visa-stamping issues that have stranded thousands of professionals outside the US have pushed the issue to a tipping point. New Delhi will be looking to Washington for relief.
Finally, India remains wary of the increasingly transactional approach that the Trump administration appears to favour. Several claims made by Trump while announcing the trade deal—including India halting Russian oil imports, committing to purchase $500 billion worth of US energy and other products, and offering zero tariffs on American goods—have not been officially confirmed by the Indian government. This gap suggests unresolved details that could yet complicate ties. India will hope that some of these assertions are political signalling rather than ultimatums that could reintroduce volatility if expectations are not met.
